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Abstract: We propose a static search model with two types of workers, output sharing
(Nash bargaining), and free entry of rms. The matching function is specied so
as the unskilled do not create congestion e¤ects for the skilled. An increase in the
share of skilled workers has two e¤ects on the welfare of the unskilled: a negative
crowding-out e¤ect, and a positive labour demand e¤ect. The former (latter) e¤ect
dominates whenever the skill di¤erential is small (large).
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1. Introduction
This paper is interested in the following market situation. Good workers are preferred to
bad workers in the recruitment process, and the total number of available jobs depends
on the protability of employment relationships. Do good workers hurt bad workers
in this environment? I answer this question by means of a very stylized static search
model with two types of workers, free entry of rms, and Nash bargaining. The matching
technology is specied so as it has constant returns to scale and the unskilled do not
create congestion e¤ects for the skilled (the so-called urn-ball technology is a particular
case). I show that an increase in the skilled proportion has two e¤ects on the welfare of
the unskilled. On the one hand, the negative crowding-out e¤ect, according to which the
unskilled probability of getting a job decreases at given number of jobs per job-seeker. On
the other hand, the positive labour demand e¤ect, according to which the total number of
advertised jobs raises with the skilled proportion. Indeed, the availability of jobs responds
to average protability through free entry, while rent-sharing implies ex-post protability
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is increasing in workers skill. I show that the crowding-out e¤ect is stronger than the
labour demand e¤ect if and only if the productivity di¤erential between skill-group is
lower than a threshold value.
The crowding-out issue has already been studied in various contributions that di¤er
according to the way the search technology is specied.
In random search models, the search technology is non-discriminant so that all indi-
viduals have the same probability of getting a job regardless their characteristics. These
papers feature the labour demand e¤ect as a result, but do not predict any crowding-out
e¤ect. Gautier (2003) and Dolado et al (2003) for instance consider a model in which
skilled and unskilled workers compete for simple jobs, while skilled workers search on the
job. There is no crowding-out e¤ect, but the skilled may have an ambiguous impact on
simple job protability. On the one hand, they may be more productive than the un-
skilled, which tends to attract more vacancies through the labour demand e¤ect. On the
other hand, they may quit the job rapidly, which tends to deter rms to post additional
vacancies through an inverse labour demand e¤ect. Gautier shows that the former e¤ect
dominates the latter whenever the skill di¤erential is su¢ ciently large.
The crowding-out e¤ect highlighted in this paper di¤ers from Acemoglu (1999) and
Rosen and Wasmer (2005), in which holding a vacancy features an option value. In these
papers, an increase in the skilled proportion may have a negative impact on the unskilled
because rms start rejecting their applications to make a better match in the future
(Acemoglu), or because unskilled wage goes down through wage bargaining (Rosen and
Wasmer). These papers make predictions that deeply di¤er from mine. An increase in
the skill di¤erential magnies the labour demand e¤ect in my paper, thereby improving
the unskilled economic situation, while it raises the value of a vacancy in Acemoglu and
Rosen and Wasmer, thereby deteriorating the unskilled welfare.
The closest paper is Shi (2002), who considers a directed search model. There are
two types of jobs and two types of workers. Firms announce wages, workers observe
wage o¤ers and send a single application. Finally, rms can select among the pool of
applicants, which lead them to favour skilled workers. Shi shows that there are two
types of equilibria: a pooling equilibrium in which high-tech and low-tech rms coexist,
and a separating equilibrium in which there are only high-tech rms. The separating
equilibrium is very close to the equilibrium I study in this paper (the main di¤erence
relies on wage determination). However, Shi only provides with comparative statics for
the pooling equilibrium, but does not examine the properties of the separating equilibrium.
I conjecture that one could reach a similar result to mine in that case1.
1There are a number of directed search models with heterogeneous rms/workers (see for instance
Shi, 2001, Lang and Manove, 2003, and Shimer, 2005). These models raise important issues, but do not
focus on the impact of changes in the composition of worker types on the extent of mismatch and the
crowding-out of lower-skilled workers.
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The remaining of the paper is organized in two parts. Section 2 introduces the model,
while section 3 shows the results.
2. The model
In this section, we depict a static search model with two types of workers, a single type
of job, Nash bargaining over match surplus, and endogenous supply of jobs. The key
assumption relates to the matching technology: there is a unique search market, yet the
low-skilled do not create congestion e¤ects for the high-skilled.
There are two types of agents seeking a job: n1 skilled and n2 unskilled workers.
Agents di¤er with respect to the amount of output they produce if employed. Type-i
agents produce 2yi. Let y2 = (1  ) y1, where = (1  )  0 is the skill premium.
There is a large number of rms, each endowed with a single job slot which can be
either active or inactive. Each active job costs cy1 > 0, c 2 (0; 1), and needs to be lled
before production starts. Inactive jobs cost nothing.
Active jobs and job-seekers meet each other on the search market. Once a given worker
is hired, she starts producing and output is split between the worker and the rm it
corresponds to symmetric Nash bargaining when outside options are nil. This implies that
rms prefer to hire skilled workers, as they get more prots with them. The aggregate
number of hires M is determined by a matching technology which inputs are the total
number of job-seekers n1 + n2 on the one hand, and the number of active jobs v on the
other hand:
M  min fm (n1 + n2; v) ; n1 + n2; vg (2.1)
The technology m is strictly increasing and strictly concave in each argument, and has
constant returns to scale. In the remaining, we only focus on equilibrium where M =
m (n1 + n2; v).
LetMi be the number of hires that involve type-i workers. By construction,M1+M2 =
M . Due to rmspreferences for the skilled, the unskilled do not create congestion for
the skilled. Therefore,
M1 = m (n1; v) (2.2)
The unskilled get the residual number of hires:
M2 = m (n1 + n2; v) m (n1; v) (2.3)
The strict concavity of m then guarantees M2 is strictly decreasing in n1 at given number
of jobs. Therefore, the skilled crowd-out the unskilled. Note that the directed search
model based on the urn-ball statistical model is a particular case of this technology.
Let i denote type-i workersprobability of getting a job, and i be rmsprobability
of recruiting a type-i individual. The number of hires is equiprobably distributed within
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each side of the market. Hence,
1 
m (n1; v)
n1
 m (1; =x) (2.4)
2 
m (n1 + n2; v) m (n1; v)
n2
 m (1; )  xm (1; =x)
1  x (2.5)
1 
m (n1; v)
v
 m (1; =x)
=x
(2.6)
2 
m (n1 + n2; v) m (n1; v)
v
 m (1; )  xm (1; =x)

(2.7)
where x  n1= (n1 + n2) is the share of skilled agents and   v= (n1 + n2) is the so-called
market tightness. Contact rates depend on either the market tightness , or the number
of jobs per skilled worker =x, or both. For instance, the probability of getting a job for
a skilled worker is decreasing in the share of skilled workers at given number of jobs. Of
course, this reveals the fact that skilled workers create congestion e¤ects for each other,
while their employment prospects do not respond to changes in the number of unskilled
workers. Conversely, the unskilled are harmed by the presence of skilled workers. The
rate of contact 2 is therefore decreasing in x at given tightness.
Let wi denote the expected utility of type-i workers, and  be the expected prots of
rms.
wi = iyi (2.8)
 = 1y1 + 2y2   cy1 (2.9)
Finally, the number of active jobs obeys the free entry condition  = 0.
3. Results
In this section, we solve the model and analyze the impacts of demographic changes on the
welfare of each skill group. The main result is the non-monotonous relationship between
the share of skilled workers and the welfare of unskilled individuals.
Consider the following function  (z)  m (1; z) =z, that is the average recruitment
rate it is strictly decreasing in z. From equations (2.6), (2.7) and (2.9), and constant
returns to scale in the matching technology, solving reduces to nd a market tightness 
such that
 (=x) +  () (1  ) = c (3.1)
The properties of the function  imply uniqueness whenever there exists an equilibrium
that we assume2. Equilibrium tightness displays the following features: it is decreasing
in the skill premium = (1  ), while it is increasing the share of skilled workers x.
2This involves additional restrictions on the matching technology m and the job creation cost c.
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What are the e¤ects of x on the welfare of skilled and unskilled workers? To answer
this question, we need to know how x alters skill-specic rates of contact. Consider rst
the skilled workers. From (2.4), we have to nd how changes in x alter the ratio z  =x.
Using (3.1), we get
 (z) +  (xz) (1  ) = c (3.2)
It is clear that z is strictly decreasing in x. Therefore, the welfare of skilled workers
decreases with their share in the workforce. This result is typical of directed search
models with mismatch (see Shi, 2002, for instance). This di¤ers from random matching
models where the skilled actually benet from an increase in their proportion.
We now turn to the unskilled. From (2.5),
x
d2=dx
2
= x
@2=@x
2
crowding-out e¤ect
<0
+


@2=@
2

x
d=dx


labour demand e¤ect
>0
(3.3)
with
x
@2=@x
2
=
x
1  x

1  m (1==x)
2
(1   (=x))

< 0 (3.4)

@2=@
2
=
 ()
1  x
m (1; )
2

1  x (=x)
 ()
m (1; =x)
m (1; )

> 0 (3.5)
x
d=dx

=

+ (1  )x (1 ())m(1;)
(1 (=x))m(1;;x)
> 0 (3.6)
where  () = m2 (1; ) =m (1; ) 2 (0; 1) for all   0.
Any change in x exerts two conicting e¤ects on job opportunities for the unskilled.
On the one hand, there is a negative crowding-out e¤ect. It is a simple partial equilibrium
e¤ect due to the fact that the skilled are favoured in the matching process. On the other
hand, there is a positive labour demand e¤ect. It is a general equilibrium e¤ect according
to which the total number of advertised jobs raises with the share of skilled workers.
Indeed, job creation is driven by protability, and rent-sharing implies the protability of
a job is increasing in skill. It follows tightness raises with the share of skilled.
Which of these two e¤ects is the largest? The response depends on the skill premium
. Indeed, the labour demand e¤ect is proportional to ";x  x (d=dx) =, the elasticity
of equilibrium tightness with respect to the skill proportion. In turn,
d";x
d
= x

";x

2
(1   ())m (1; )
(1   (=x))m (1; ; x) > 0 (3.7)
One must check that matching probabilities are well dened, i.e. lower than one. This is so whenever
m (1; =x) < 1, and m (1; ) = < 1. These conditions are always satised with the urn-ball technology.
In this case, there exists an equilibrium i¤ 0 < c < 1.
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The higher the skill di¤erential, the higher the labour demand e¤ect. Suppose rst  = 0.
Then, all workers are equally productive. It follows that ";x = 0 and equilibrium tightness
does not respond to changes in the composition of the workforce. The labour demand
e¤ect vanishes as a result. Then, the crowding-out e¤ect implies that the welfare of un-
skilled workers strictly decreases with the skilled proportion. As  increases, the elasticity
of equilibrium tightness with the skilled proportion increases too and the magnitude of
the labour demand e¤ect raises. In the limit case where  tends to 1, we have
x
d2=dx
2

=1
=
x
1  x

1  (1   (=x))m (1; =x)
2

+
 ()
1  x
m (1; )
2

1  x (=x)
 ()
m (1; =x)
m (1; )

which has the sign of
 (x) = m (1; ) [x+  ()   ()x]  xm (1; =x) (3.8)
But  (0) > 0,  (1) = 0 and 0 (x) = (1   ())m (1; )   (1   (=x))m (1; =x) < 0
because m is strictly concave. Therefore, we have xd2=dx
2

=1
> 0. It follows that there
exists a unique skill di¤erential b 2 (0; 1) such that xd2=dx
2
> 0 if and only if  > b.
In words, the labour demand e¤ect dominates the crowding-out e¤ect whenever the skill
di¤erential is su¢ ciently strong. This result holds for a very large class of matching
technologies, including the Cobb-Douglas function as well as the urn-ball technology.
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
This Appendix is not designed to be published. I discuss with greater details the
existence of a non-trivial equilibrium. I mainly provide with constraints on the matching
technology m and the cost of creating a job c.
An equilibrium is a tightness/mass number of rms  > 0 which satises
 (=x) +  () (1  ) = c (i)
m (1; =x) < 1 (ii)
m (1; ) = < 1 (iii)
Condition (i) is the free-entry condition. There is a non-trivial number of rms that must
be compatible with the zero-prot condition.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) check that there is an interior equilibrium. (ii) says that type-1
workers matching probability is lower than one. This also guarantees that type-2 workers
matching probability is lower than one. (iii) says that rms matching probability is lower
than one. Given that m (n; v) is strictly concave, m (1; a) =a is strictly decreasing in a.
This implies uniqueness.
I now deal with the existence of equilibrium. In this goal, I make two (weak) assump-
tions on the technology m:
A1 There is a unique   such that m (1;  ) =  = 1
A2 There is a unique + such that m (1; +=x) = 1, or lim
!1
m (1; =x) = 1. In
the latter case, + =1.
I can state the following existence result.
There exists a unique equilibrium i¤
  < + (a)
m (1;  =x)
 =x
+ 1   > c (b)
m (1; +=x)
+=x
+
1  
+
< c (c)
The proof is simple. Let  () =  (=x)  +  () (1  )   c. An equilibrium
solves  () = 0. Condition (a) o¤ers an interval of values for  that is compatible
with conditions (ii) and (iii) exposed above. Condition (b) and (c) together state that
 (+) < 0 <  ( ). The continuity of  then implies that there is a 
 2 ( ; +) such
that  () = 0. Given that  is strictly decreasing,  is unique.
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Let me consider two examples: a Cobb-Douglas matching technology, and the urn-ball
matching technology.
In the Cobb-Douglas case, we have m (1; ) = A, A < 0 and  2 (0; 1). One can
check that
  = A
1
1  (4.1)
+ = xA
 1= (4.2)
The set of conditions above is the following
A
1
(1 ) < x (a)
x1 + 1   > c (b)
A1=+ x 1A1= (1  ) < c (c)
It is easy to construct an equilibrium. Choose x,  and  and pick c such that x1  +
1   > c. Then, set a su¢ ciently low A to satisfy conditions (a) and (c).
In the urn-ball technology case, we havem (1; ) = 
 
1  e 1=. It follows that   = 0
and + =1, which imply that (a) holds. Then, it is easy to check that (b) is equivalent
to c < 1, and (c) is equivalent to c > 0. It follows that there exists a unique equilibrium
i¤ 0 < c < 1.
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